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Under what conditions do ﬁrms increase or decrease their innovation expendi-
tures? What is the eﬀect of knowledge ﬂows between ﬁrms on their innovation
eﬀort? What determines ﬁrms’ propensity to cooperatively conduct research?
In times of rapid technological progress and increased governmental interest in
innovation policy, these issues are high both on the political and on the industrial
economist’s agenda.
Empirical evidence on the determinants of research joint venture formation and
on the eﬀects of these research cooperations on research eﬀorts is scarce. Eco-
nomic theory thus often guides economic policy to optimally allocate research
and development subsidies. Economic theory traditionally assumes that a ﬁrm’s
ability to absorb knowledge from competitors is independent from it’s own re-
search expenditures. Such an assumption is unlikely to meet with reality well
since a ﬁrm which does not invest in research at all does not have any capacity to
absorb knowledge from other ﬁrms’ research programs. In this paper, the degree
to which ﬁrms are able to absorb knowledge is made dependent upon their own
research eﬀorts: the more a ﬁrm invests in research, the more it can absorb from
other ﬁrms’ stock of knowledge. It turns out that the eﬀect of research joint
ventures crucially depends upon the competitiveness of the market and upon the
generality of ﬁrms’ research approach. The model derived in this paper hence
leads to quite diﬀerent conclusions than models ignoring the endogeneity of ﬁrms’
research approaches.A Simple Game–theoretic Framework for studying
R&D expenditures and R&D Cooperation
Ulrich Kaiser¤
Centre for European Economic Research
April 2001
Abstract: This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research col-
laboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of
knowledge ﬁrms can absorb is made dependent on their own research eﬀorts, e.g. ﬁrms’
absorptive capacity is treated as an endogenous variable. It is shown that cooperat-
ing ﬁrms invest more in R&D than non–cooperating ﬁrms if spillovers are suﬃciently
large. The degree of market competition is a key determinant of the eﬀects of research
cooperation on research eﬀorts, implying that existing models which assume perfect
competition might be too restrictive.
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In 1952, John Kenneth Galbraith noted that the ‘era of cheap innovation’ was
over. He claimed that ﬁrms had exhausted low–cost R&D programs and were
now forced to pool their R&D eﬀorts in order to achieve scientiﬁc progress and to
gain and to retain market power. Until the mid–eighties, however, antitrust law
hampered ﬁrms’ collaboration in the R&D process. More than 30 years passed by
since Galbraith’s statement before US and European governments considerably
relaxed antitrust law to allow cooperative R&D.
Starting points of this relaxation were the positive results from some German
and US research collaborations. Spencer and Grindley (1993) argue that the
R&D consortium SEMATECH contributed signiﬁcantly to the leading position
of the US in semiconductor industries. Jorde and Teece (1990) trace the success
of German mechanical engineering products in the seventies and eighties back to
the partly industrially–ﬁnanced research institutions.
For Germany, a strong increase in the number of research joint ventures (RJVs)
can be observed. While only ten percent of all manufacturing ﬁrms in Germany
were involved in R&D cooperations in 1971, 20 years later almost half of all the
ﬁrms in manufacturing industries conducted cooperative research (K¨ onig et al.,
1994). Based on US Department of Justice data, Vonortas (1997) shows that a
sharp increase in the number of RJVs is also present in the US. The interest of
economic policy in RJVs is still unchanged since R&D subsidies are increasingly
often bound to joint R&D eﬀorts.
Microeconomists began to develop theoretical frameworks to describe R&D ex-
penditure and R&D cooperation in the mid–eighties. Pioneering contributions
on R&D investment with spillovers are Brander and Spencer (1983), Katz (1986)
and Spence (1986). A large strand of the more recent literature is built on
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990), who develop a two–stage Cournot
duopoly game for R&D expenditures and product market competition. Many
subsequent papers adopted the structure of this model with modiﬁcations. A
particular relevant extension is that of Kamien et al. (1992), who introduce
oligopoly markets and also allow the degree of product substitution to vary be-
tween perfect complements and perfect substitutes. In fact, the contribution of
Kamien et al. is more than just an extension of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin as
1Amir (2000) has recently pointed out. He shows that the two models have some
quite diﬀerent implications, e.g. with respect to R&D levels under alternative co-
operation scenarios. A survey of the existing literature on research cooperations
can be omitted here since extensive reviews by De Bondt (1996), Cohen (1995)
and Geroski (1995) already exist. While the ﬁrst author is mainly concerned
with theoretical contributions to the literature, the latter summarizes empirical
ﬁndings.1
A main question of the literature on RJV formation is: ‘Does cooperative R&D
increase or decrease R&D eﬀorts?’. The common answer is that it depends on
the relation of the level of spillovers to a term usually consisting of product sub-
stitutability and market demand. Research spillovers arise whenever knowledge
produced by ﬁrm i is voluntarily or involuntarily given to some other ﬁrm j with-
out ﬁrm j having paid for it. If spillovers are suﬃciently large, R&D investment
under RJV exceeds that of competition. Intuitively, there are two opposing ef-
fects of research joint ventures on research eﬀorts. Due to the internalization of
spillover — it is assumed that knowledge is fully exchanged in an RJV —, R&D
investment is stimulated. Business–stealing counteracts this positive eﬀect on
R&D spending and may dominate the positive eﬀect attributable to the internal-
ization of technical spillovers. The competition eﬀect depends upon the degree
of product substitution so that this factor is a main determinant of the eﬀect of
joint research on research spending. This point is detailed in Section 2 below.
The theoretical part of this paper shares the essential features of the D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) model. As in Kamien et al. (1992), the D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin framework is extended to explicitly model the R&D cooperation
decision. Firms’ R&D expenditure level, their R&D decision and their compe-
tition on the output market is modelled in a three–stage duopoly game. In the
ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation. In the
second stage, they decide upon their R&D expenditures. Lastly, they compete
in a Cournot–duopoly product market.
While in most existing studies — with the exception of Kamien and Zang (2000)
— the extend to which ﬁrms can absorb knowledge is assumed to be exogenously
determined, it is treated as a function of own innovation eﬀorts this paper. The
model developed here is closely related to that of Kamien and Zang (2000) but
1Also see the special issue of ‘Annales d’´ Economie et de Statistique’, vol. 49/50 (1998), on
‘The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation’ and the references cited therein.
2takes into account more complex and interesting market demand function since
it does not restrict products to be perfect substitutes as in Kamien and Zang.
As it shall turn out later on the answer to the question whether or not research
eﬀort is larger under cooperation than under competition hinges upon the degree
of product substitution.
While existing studies usually do not take into account the endogeneity of ab-
sorptive capacity, it in fact appears to be unlikely that ﬁrms can gain from
each other’s knowledge independently of their own research eﬀort. Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) have empirically shown and theoretically described that ﬁrms’
absorptive capacity critically depends on own research eﬀorts. In traditional
models, it is assumed that even a ﬁrm which does not invest in R&D at all gains
from the stock of knowledge to an identical extent as another ﬁrm which spends
a large amount of money on research.
Important and empirically testable ﬁndings of the theoretical model are (i) that
research eﬀorts are larger under RJV than under competition if exogenous spillovers
are suﬃciently large, (ii) that an increase in R&D productivity positively aﬀects
both R&D eﬀorts and RJV formation and (iii) that an increase in market demand
leads to an increase in R&D eﬀorts. Under the condition that the direct eﬀect of
changes in market demand, in the elasticity of product substitution and in the
generality of the R&D approach is larger than the eﬀect of these changes in inno-
vation eﬀorts, the following additional conclusions can be drawn: (i) increasing
market demand and (ii) an increasing generality of the R&D approach provide
incentives to form RJVs while (iii) an increase in product substitutability has
negative eﬀects on RJV formation.
2 Model
2.1 Market demand
In order to keep things tractable and interpretable, this paper deals with process
innovation only. In Kaiser and Licht (1998), we consider both process and product
R&D in a Cournot oligopoly framework with exogenous spillovers. We show that
the optimality conditions for product and process R&D have virtually the same
structure and that results obtained for product R&D are qualitatively also valid
for process R&D.
3Let the market be characterized by two one–product ﬁrms producing products i
and j. Market demand is linear and given by:
pi = 1 ¡ b¾qj ¡ bqi; (1)
where pi denotes the price of ﬁrm i’s product and qi (qj) denotes the quantity of
product i (j). The parameter ¾ is a measure of substitutability of the two goods
with ¾ 2 [0;1]. If ¾ = 1, the two goods are perfect substitutes and if ¾ = 0,
the two goods are perfect complements (this is the monopoly case). The term b
denotes inverse market demand, the ratio of the number of ﬁrms over the number
of customers.
2.2 R&D production function
Following the tradition of R&D cooperation models (c.f. Kamien et al., 1992),
market structure is modelled as a Cournot game in which ﬁrms can decrease
production costs by conducting R&D. R&D eﬀorts do not only contribute to a
reduction of own production costs but also spill over to competitors, customers
or suppliers. R&D–performing ﬁrms, however, have the possibility of conducting
R&D in cooperation with other ﬁrms. In this case, results of R&D are assumed
to be fully exchanged. By performing cooperative R&D, ﬁrms can internalize
the externalities related to the R&D process. The deterministic R&D model sug-
gested here falls short of real innovation processes which are driven by risk and
irreversibilities.2
The main assumptions on production techniques, R&D spillovers and R&D pro-
duction functions are brieﬂy introduced below. The production conditions are
captured by a cost function ki. By conducting R&D, ﬁrms can decrease marginal
costs. Denoting Xi the eﬀective level of R&D — own R&D plus R&D received
from other ﬁrms — of ﬁrm i, the unit cost function of ﬁrm i is assumed to be
given by:
ki = ci ¡ f(Xi); (2)
where f(Xi) denotes the R&D production function of process innovation and ci
denotes ﬁxed costs. The cost function (2) represents per–unit production costs
2Beaudreau (1996) discusses a model that takes into account the uncertainty and multidi-
mensionality without, however, ﬁnding markedly diﬀerent results compared to contributions
based on the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) framework.
4which are measured in monetary units. It is required that
f(0) = 0; f(Xi) < ci; f0(Xi) > 0; f00(Xi) < 0; (3)
limXi!1 f0(Xi) ! 0 and (1 ¡ ki)f00(Xi) + f0(Xi)2 < 0:
These assumptions assure that no process innovation is achieved if it is not in-
vested in R&D, production costs are positive, the R&D production function is
increasing and concave in eﬀective R&D, marginal productivity of R&D goes to
zero as eﬀective R&D approaches inﬁnity and that R&D costs show a steeper
increase than the returns of R&D so that it is prevented that ﬁrms boundlessly
invest in R&D.
Following Kamien and Zang (2000), ﬁrm i’s eﬀective R&D, Xi, depends upon
own R&D, xi and the spillovers ﬁrm i receives from the other ﬁrm. Both eﬀec-
tive and own R&D are measured in monetary units. Eﬀective R&D is assumed
to be given by





with ±;¯ 2 [0;1].3 Equation (4) implies that if ﬁrm i does not invest in R&D at
all, it cannot receive any spillovers from other ﬁrms’ research eﬀorts.
The parameter ¯ denotes the exogenously–given intensity of R&D spillovers. It
can, e.g. be interpreted as a parameter reﬂecting the degree of patent protection.
For ¯ = 0, patents perfectly protect research results, for ¯ = 1, patents are com-
pletely unable to protect research results; ¯ reﬂects the restricted possibility to
protect research results.
The parameter ± denotes ﬁrm i’s “R&D approach” (Kamien and Zang, 2000, p.
998). That is, if ± = 0, ﬁrms are both universal recipients from and universal
donors of other ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts (‘general R&D approach’). Firm i’s eﬀective
R&D function then reduces to the standard formulation of eﬀective R&D (e.g.,
Beath et al., 1998; D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, 1990; Kamien et al., 1992)
for duopolies, Xi = xi + ¯xj.
At the other extreme, with ± = 1, eﬀective R&D is equal to own R&D. Then,
ﬁrms are neither able to internalize any of the other ﬁrms’ knowledge nor do they
contribute to other ﬁrms’ eﬀective R&D (‘speciﬁc R&D approach’). If ± lies in
between the two extreme cases, eﬀective R&D is homogeneous of degree one in
xi.
3In the original paper by Kamien and Zang (2000), ﬁrms decide upon ± in an additional
stage of a Cournot oligopoly game.
5Hence, the parameter ± reﬂects how applied, as opposed to how speciﬁc, how ori-
ented towards science, the research program is. For large values of ±, the research
program is focused on basic research whereas it aims at applied research for small
values of ±.
2.3 Stage III: Product market competition with R&D ex-
penditures given
The R&D oligopoly game is solved by backwards induction. In stage III of the
game, the two ﬁrms choose the optimal level of output given sunk costs. Collusive
agreements concerning the level of output are ruled out. Firms maximize their
proﬁts, Π, independently by choosing the optimal level of output qi:
maxqi Πi = (pi ¡ ki)qi ¡ xi: (5)




(1 ¡ ki) + ¾
2¡¾
³




Comparative–static analysis shows, see Appendix A, that an increase in the de-
gree of substitutability leads to a decrease in own output, that own output in-
creases with market size and that it decreases if more speciﬁc R&D approaches
are chosen.
2.4 Stage II: Determination of the R&D level
In the second stage of the game, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts by optimally choosing
R&D eﬀorts. If ﬁrms decide not to cooperate in R&D in the ﬁrst stage of the
game, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function is given by:
maxxi Πi = b q
¤
i(xi;xj)
2 ¡ xi; (7)
In a symmetric equilibrium, where ﬁrm subscripts can be omitted, optimal R&D
expenditures follow from the ﬁrst order condition:
Ψ
c =
f0(Xc)(1 ¡ c + f(Xc)) 2
³
2 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)(±(2 + ¾) ¡ ¾)
´
b(2 ¡ ¾)(2 + ¾)2 ¡ 1 = 0 (8)
6where Xc denotes eﬀective R&D of ﬁrm i under separate proﬁt maximization
(Cournot). The impact of spillovers on R&D expenditures under R&D competi-
tion is ambiguous. It is positive if
f0(Xc)(±(2 + ¾) ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ k)
| {z }







and negative otherwise.4 This condition simply states that there are two eﬀects
working against one another in a RJV: there are positive technological spillovers
which arise from the joint use of research results and there are negative com-
petitive spillovers which are due to the fact that ﬁrm i can use ﬁrm j’s research
results to improve its relative competitive position.
If ﬁrms decide to cooperate in R&D in the ﬁrst stage of the game, they maximize
joint proﬁts over their R&D eﬀorts. The optimal R&D equations of Kamien et
al. (1992) are obtained by neglecting the endogeneity of absorptive capacity by
setting ± = 0. Under RJV — as, e.g. in Kamien et al. (1992) — full information
sharing is assumed, ¯ takes on the value 1:
maxxi;xj Π = b q
¤
i(xi;xj)
2 ¡ xi + b q
¤
j(xi;xj)
2 ¡ xj; (10)
which leads to the following ﬁrst–order–condition:
Ψ
jv =
f0(Xjv)(1 ¡ c + f(Xjv)) 2 (1 ¡ ±)
b(2 + ¾)2 ¡ 1 = 0 (11)
where X
jv
i denotes eﬀective R&D expenditures under joint proﬁt maximization.
The consequences of research collaboration for the level of R&D expenditures in
the case of R&D cooperation can be drawn from comparing equations (11) and
(8) and using the set of assumptions (3). For suﬃciently large spillovers, e.g.,
¯ ¸
(2 ¡ ¾)(2 ¡ ±) ¡ 2
(1 ¡ ±)(±(2 + ¾) ¡ ¾)
; (12)
R&D eﬀorts are larger under RJV than under Cournot competition. Condition





diﬀerence to the Kamien et al. (1992) special case of truly exogeneous spillovers
4Note the diﬀerence for ± = 0: under exogenous spillovers, the impact of an increase in
exogenous spillovers on R&D expenditures is unambiguously negative if goods are substitutes.
7(± = 0) are striking since in their model research eﬀorts are always larger under
RJV than in research competition. In the Kamien and Zang (2000) model with
¾ = 1, ﬁrms choose R&D approaches which ensure that the cooperative R&D
exceeds noncooperative R&D if ¯ ¸ 0:5.
The extreme cases of perfect competition and perfect substitution are also con-
tained in the model presented here. If goods are perfect substitutes in the model
presented here, the cooperative level of R&D exceeds the noncooperative level
if the R&D approach is suﬃciently speciﬁc: ± > 1=3, implying that in the case
of tough competition, business–stealing eﬀects due to cooperation overweigh the
internalization eﬀects only if the R&D approach is not to general. In the other
extreme case, the monopoly case with ¾ = 0, the cooperative R&D levels never
exceed the noncooperative ones. This is quite unsurprising since there are no in-
centives to cooperate in R&D in monopoly, at least in models which focus on the
in terms of policy relevance more interesting horizontal spillovers.5 The contour
plot of equation (12) displayed in Figure 1 visualizes the eﬀects of the alternative
combinations of the degree of product substitution, ¾ and the generality of the
R&D approach, ±. It is restricted to be in the [0,1] range since ¯ also is in [0,1]
so that condition (12) is always met in the black area while it is never met in the
white area in Figure 1, for example if ¾ = 0 as pointed out above. A decrease
in the generality of the R&D approach has two opposing eﬀects on the incentive
too form an RJV. On the one hand, involuntary knowledge leakage is reduced.
On the other hand, ﬁrms gain from one another’s knowledge to a lesser extend
if they pursue narrow R&D approaches. Which eﬀect actually overweighs — i.e.
if competition eﬀects exceed internalization eﬀects — depends upon the market
structure, implying that it is worthwhile to consider more complex market struc-
tures instead of focussing attention to the extreme case of perfect substitution.
Other results from comparative–static analysis, see Appendix B, of equations (8)
and (11) are that (i) an increase in R&D generality leads to an increase in research
eﬀorts under research competition if the research approach already is suﬃciently
general, e.g. ± < ¾=(2 + ¾), while the eﬀect in the case of research cooperation
is not determined a priori,6 (ii) an increase in the degree of substitutability has
5A theoretical model distinguishing between vertical and horizontal cooperation is presented
by Inkmann (2000). Harhoﬀ (1996, 1997) and Peters (1995, 1997) consider strategic investment
in R&D which spills over to downstream suppliers.
6Research expenditures increase with a decrease in R&D generality if f0 (1 ¡ k) + x (1 ¡
±) (f02 + (1 ¡ k) f00) < 0.
8Figure 1: Contour plot of equation (12)
Note: The darker the shaded areas are, the more likely it is that cooperative R&D is larger
than noncooperative R&D, and vice versa. The completely white area indicates that under
the corresponding ¾=±–combinations cooperative R&D always is smaller than noncooperative
R&D.
a disincentive eﬀect on research eﬀorts under competition if ¾ < 2=3; the eﬀect
of product substitution on optimal R&D under cooperation is not determined,
(iii) an increase in market demand leads to an increase in research eﬀorts both
under RJV and competition, and (iv) an increase in R&D productivity positively
aﬀects research eﬀorts in both cases as well.7
2.5 Stage I: R&D cooperation
Incentives for ﬁrms to cooperatively conduct R&D become apparent from com-

















i > 0: (13)
Both proﬁt functions are globally concave in xi as long as conditions (3) hold.
Incentives to start a research joint venture increase with increasing diﬀerences in
proﬁts.
7The last result is not shown in Appendix B since it is obvious from equations (8) and (11).
9Incentives to start an RJV increase with increasing exogenous spillovers, ¯, if
"xc;¯ > f0[Xc] "xc;¯ with "xc;¯ denoting the elasticity of research expenditures
with respect to spillovers.
Increases in R&D productivity create incentives to form an RJV. Provided that
the direct eﬀects of changes in the generality of the R&D approach, in market
demand and in product substitutability are larger than their indirect eﬀects via
research eﬀorts, increases in (i) the generality of the R&D approach8 and (ii)
in product substitutability create incentive eﬀects to RJV formation. (iii) An
increase in market demand leads to an increased likelihood of RJV formation.
2.6 Testable model implications
The hypotheses derived from the theoretical model can be summarized as follows:
1. An increase in research productivity has a positive eﬀect on RJV formation.
2. An increase in the generality of a ﬁrm’s R&D approach creates incentive to
form an RJV.
3. An increase in market demand has a positive eﬀect on RJV formation.
4. Research eﬀorts are larger under RJV than under research competition
provided that spillovers are suﬃciently large.
5. An increase in research productivity has a positive eﬀect on R&D expendi-
tures.
6. An increase in the generality of a ﬁrm’s R&D approach leads to an increase
in R&D expenditures under research competition provided that the R&D
approach already is suﬃciently general.
7. An increase in market demand has a positive eﬀect on R&D expenditures.
These hypotheses are empirically tested on the basis of German service sector
data by Kaiser (2001), who ﬁnds that his estimation results are broadly con-
sistent with the predictions of the model derived here. The empirical evidence
provided by Kaiser and Licht (1998) for German manufacturing industries, who
8Note that if ﬁrms pursue a very speciﬁc R&D approach (± = 1), there are no incentives at
all to collaborate in R&D since absorptive capacity is zero in this case.
10do not consider endogenous absorptive capacity, also is in accordance to the
hypotheses listed above. An insigniﬁcant impact of both vertical cooperations
(cooperations between a ﬁrm and its suppliers or/and customers) and horizontal
cooperations (cooperations among competitors) on the R&D intensity of German
ﬁrms is found by Inkmann (2000). He also ﬁnds signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of
intra–industry spillovers on R&D intensity and a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of
inter–industry spillovers, while horizontal spillovers increase the tendency to co-
operate with customers. Cassiman and Veugelers (1999) analyze Belgian ﬁrms
to uncover the diﬀerential eﬀects of incoming and outgoing spillovers and ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with large incoming spillovers and lower outgoing spillovers (better
appropriation) have a higher probability of cooperating in R&D.
Other empirical work on RJVs has focused on the anatomy of the research part-
ners. Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1992) study the determinants of research coop-
eration in Dutch manufacturing industries. They come to the quite surprising
conclusion that ﬁrm size does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the propensity to
cooperate. By contrast, the existence of an R&D department, granted patents,
licensing and sectoral aﬃliation signiﬁcantly aﬀect ﬁrms’ propensity to cooper-
ate. The results by Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1992) may suﬀer from simultaneous
equation bias. R¨ oller et al. (1998) use a simultaneous equation setup. In their
analysis of U.S. ﬁrms that participate in RJVs they ﬁnd a tendency towards co-
operation among ﬁrms of similar size and that RJV formation is dependent on a
number of industry–speciﬁc eﬀects. Veugelers (1993) describes the proﬁle of 668
international research alliances and ﬁnds that improved market access, monitor-
ing and control as well as complementarities in assets drive cooperative research.
3 Conclusions
In this paper a three stage Cournot–oligopoly game for product market compe-
tition, optimal R&D eﬀort and research cooperation is derived. In contrast to
most existing studies, the degree to which ﬁrms can absorb knowledge from other
ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts is made dependent on their own research expenditures: ﬁrms
which do not invest in R&D are unable to retrieve any knowledge from competi-
tors.
The theoretical framework is closely related to Kamien and Zang (2000) but
11considers a more complex and more interesting market demand function since it
does not restrict products to be perfect substitutes. It turns out that the crucial
economic question if research expenditures are larger under research cooperation
than under research competition crucially depends on the degree of product sub-
stitution. Intuitively, two opposing eﬀects determine if research expenditures are
larger in an RJV than in research competition: a positive internalization eﬀect
and a negative competition, or business–stealing, eﬀect. The degree of product
substitution of course is a main determinant of the degree related to the business–
stealing eﬀect so that it in fact appears worthwhile not to restrict goods to be
perfect substitutes as in Kamien and Zang (2000).
12Appendix A: Comparative–static properties of the product quantity equa-
tion (6)





b (2 + ¾)
< 0 in symmetric equilibrium (14)




1 ¡ c + f
b2 (2 + ¾)
< 0 in symmetric equilibrium (15)






b (2 + ¾)
< 0 in symmetric equilibrium (16)
13Appendix B: Comparative–static properties of optimal process innovation
spending, equations (8) and (11)
Since the partial derivatives of Ψc and Ψjv with respect to process innovation
spending, x, are negative under both regimes, the partial derivatives of Ψc and
Ψjv with respect to ¾, b and ± directly determine the eﬀect of the respective





2(1 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)) (2 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)(±(2 + ¾) ¡ ¾)) (f02 + (1 ¡ k) g00)





2(2 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±)(f02 + (1 ¡ k)f00)






4(2 ¡ 3¾ + ¯(± ¡ 1)(¾ + 2±¾ ¡ 2 + (± ¡ 1)¾2))(k ¡ 1)f0
b(¾ ¡ 2)2(2 + ¾)3 < 0 (19)





f0(1 ¡ k) + x(1 ¡ ±)(f02 + (1 ¡ k)f00)






2(2 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)(±(2 + ¾ ¡ ¾)))(1 ¡ k)g0













2¯(2 + (1 + ¾ ¡ ±(2 + ¾))(1 ¡ k)g0 ¡ x(2 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)(2± ¡ (1 ¡ ±)¾))(f02 + (1 ¡ k)f00))
b(2 ¡ ¾)(2 + ¾)2)2 < 0 (23)





2(f0(1 ¡ k) + x(1 ¡ ±)(f02 + (1 ¡ k)f00))
b(2 + ¾)2 ! undetermined (24)
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